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A LACK OF CIVILITY: HOW NEW JERSEY LAW FAILS TO
PROTECT WOMEN
*

Nick Tamburri
I. INTRODUCTION

M.R. had been living in New Jersey for six years when he met
1
A.R. in 1985. The two became romantically involved and moved to
Mississippi in 1987, where they were married shortly after the birth of
2
their first child. They had two more children and moved back and
forth between Mississippi and New Jersey several times during their
3
marriage before settling in Mississippi in 1989. The marriage began
to deteriorate soon thereafter and A.R. was increasingly subjected to
4
various forms of domestic violence. The mental and physical abuse
reached its apex on April 4, 2000, when M.R., unprovoked, jumped
5
on top of A.R. as she laid in bed. M.R. proceeded to pin her down,
yanking her hair and repeatedly punching her in the face, neck, and
6
jaw. Her resistance was futile. Her cries for help only served to
worsen the situation, causing A.R. to dig the barrel of his gun into
7
her temple and threaten to blow her brains out “all over th[e] wall.”
After receiving emergency care at the hospital later that night,
8
A.R. took her children and fled to her sister’s home in New Jersey.
But M.R. had previously threatened to kill the entire family,
*

J.D. Candidate, 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Rutgers
University, 2001. I would like to thank the City of Newark Law Department for
affording me the opportunity to work in the Civil Litigation Division. I would like to
thank Gary Lipshutz, Esq. in particular for allowing me to work on the S.P. matter
and for his continued cooperation and support during the drafting of this Comment.
His initial research and work on this matter were the impetus for the thesis set forth
in this Comment. I would also like especially to thank Jessica Miles, Esq., Assistant
Clinical Professor at Seton Hall Law, for her legal expertise and invaluable research
assistance and advice.
1
A.R. v. M.R., 799 A.2d 27, 28–29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
2
Id. at 29.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
A.R., 799 A.2d at 30.
8
Id.
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including himself, if she ever tried to leave him. M.R. called the
house repeatedly over the next few days in an effort to locate his
10
family. A.R. was able to obtain an ex parte temporary restraining
order (TRO) less than a week later as a result of the fear created by
11
M.R.’s phone calls, thus preventing him from contacting A.R. A.R.
v. M.R. manifests the crucial role that a domestic violence protective
order can serve in the effort to protect a woman from violence.
By contrast, S.P. v. City of Newark illustrates the potential
limitations of the current New Jersey domestic violence laws by
12
emphasizing their exclusive nature. In S.P., the plaintiff lived in a
boarding house across the hall from Louis Santiago, Jr.
13
(“Santiago”)—her eventual attacker. She contacted the police after
14
Santiago made sexual advances and grabbed her inappropriately.
But S.P. had no ability to obtain a civil protection order, due to gaps
15
in New Jersey law. The police did not make an arrest and failed to
16
remove Santiago from the premises. Santiago sexually assaulted S.P.
17
the next morning.
The current law in New Jersey leaves a class of potential victims
in danger because it does not protect those who are not involved in a
18
specific, statutorily-defined relationship. The New Jersey Prevention
of Domestic Violence Act of 1991 (PDVA or the Act) defines a “victim
of domestic violence” as:
any person who is [eighteen] years of age or older or who is
an emancipated minor and who has been subjected to
domestic violence by a spouse, former spouse, or any other
person who is a present or former household member. “Victim of
domestic violence” also includes any person, regardless of
age, who has been subjected to domestic violence by a
person with whom the victim has a child in common, or
with whom the victim anticipates having a child in common,
if one of the parties is pregnant. “Victim of domestic
violence” also includes any person who has been subjected
to domestic violence by a person with whom the victim has
9

Id.
Id.
11
Id.
12
See infra Part V; S.P. v. Newark Police Dept., 52 A.3d 178 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2012).
13
S.P., 52 A.3d at 180.
14
Id.
15
See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-17–35 (West 2011); see also infra Part III.
16
S.P., 52 A.3d at 181.
17
Id.; see infra Part V.
18
See §§ 2C:25-17–35.
10
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had a dating relationship.
Those who fall outside the scope of this definition cannot obtain
20
a civil protection order under any circumstances. Additionally, the
judiciary must determine who constitutes a “household member,” as
that term is not defined under the statute. This ambiguity can
threaten potential victims, making it harder for them to immediately
obtain a TRO.
Santiago’s assault was disgraceful, but it was unclear whether it
was an act of domestic violence under New Jersey law because it was
questionable whether the judiciary would conclude that Santiago and
21
S.P. were “household members” under the PDVA. Such violence
and the corresponding lack of protection given to the victim is
representative of a chasm that exists under current New Jersey law.
In accordance with legislative intent, the judiciary has justifiably
interpreted the domestic violence protection laws liberally to afford
22
sweeping protection to victims. Still, if the judiciary was to further
expand its interpretation of “household member,” it would offer
23
recourse to victims whom the Act was not intended to protect.
Specifically, the Act is intended to protect victims of domestic
24
violence only.
Thus, the law necessarily leaves certain victims
without recourse. These victims may include any woman sexually
assaulted by a co-worker, classmate, acquaintance, stranger, or even a
friend she has not dated. Therefore, New Jersey must enact a
separate civil-remedy statute to safeguard these potential victims from
domestic violence.
This Comment will examine a victim’s ability to obtain redress in
New Jersey for acts of violence committed by an acquaintance or a
stranger. Specifically, it will examine how New Jersey law applies to
women who may not fall within the traditional definition of what
constitutes a “household member” under the PDVA. Part II of this
Comment takes a historical look at domestic violence. Part III
explains the role of civil protective orders and their ability to
safeguard potential victims. Specifically, it examines Maryland law
and its use of civil protection orders. Part IV then reviews the law
under the PDVA. Part V examines S.P. v. City of Newark, a case
recently decided by the Appellate Division, to illustrate why New
19
20
21
22
23
24

§ 2C:25-19(d) (West 2011) (emphasis added).
See §§ 2C:25-17–35.
See id.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part II.A.
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Jersey must allow potential victims to obtain protective orders outside
of the domestic violence context. This section examines how courts
in New Jersey have interpreted the term “household member” under
the statute and the resulting implications for women such as S.P.
Finally, Part VI will discuss New Jersey’s options to address the
situation and change its current law. This Comment will argue that
New Jersey should add a statute that allows a potential victim the
ability to obtain a civil protective order under New Jersey civil law.
II. THE BACKGROUND ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
25

Domestic violence is an epidemic. Every nine seconds in the
26
United States, a woman is assaulted or beaten. Domestic violence
accounts for more injuries to women than car accidents, muggings,
27
and rapes combined. It is the leading cause of injury to women in
28
the United States and also “accounts for twenty percent of all non29
fatal [sic] crime experienced by women in [this country].” The cost
of intimate-partner violence alone in the United States exceeds $5.8
billion each year—$4.1 billion of which goes to direct medical and
health care services, while productivity losses account for nearly $1.8
30
billion.
Domestic violence is defined as the “willful intimidation, physical
assault, battery, sexual assault, and/or other abusive behavior
31
perpetrated by an intimate partner against another.”
It affects
people of all ages, economic statuses, races, religions, and
32
educational backgrounds. Despite such revealing statistics, domestic
violence has not always figured so prominently in our collective
consciousness as a societal issue. Historically, domestic violence was
viewed as a private matter and not the concern of the criminal justice
33
system or society as a whole. Thus, common law courts protected a
25

See Cesare v. Cesare, 713 A.2d 390, 391 (N.J. 1998).
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STATISTICS, http://domesticviolencestatistics.org
/domestic-violence-statistics/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2012).
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers Accountable for Silencing
Their Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857, 867 (2009).
30
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STATISTICS, supra note 26.
31
Domestic Violence Facts, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
http://www.ncadv.org/files/DomesticViolenceFactSheet(National).pdf (last visited
Feb. 6, 2012).
32
Id.
33
Davis Jaros, The Lessons of People v. Moscat: Confronting Judicial Bias in Domestic
Violence Cases Interpreting Crawford v. Washington, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 995, 1000
(2005).
26
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man’s right to use domestic violence as a tool to manage his
34
household.
Western law provided a man with the right to chastise to his wife,
allowing sanctioned violence against women according to the
35
common-law “rule of thumb.” This rule allowed a husband to beat
his wife with a stick, so long as the stick was no wider than his
36
thumb.
Thus, courts were very reluctant at common law to get
involved in family matters. The rule’s proponents justified it “as a
natural and necessary right of control, incident to the man’s role as
37
head of the family.” This was reflective of the widely held societal
38
view that family was its own private entity.
The North Carolina Supreme Court captured the prevailing
sentiment of the times in State v. Rhodes: “We will not inflict upon
society the greater evil of raising the curtain upon domestic privacy,
39
to punish the lesser evil of trifling violence.”
Three years later,
Alabama became the first state to rule that a husband did not have
40
the right to beat his wife. The Alabama Supreme Court held that a
“wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that the husband
41
can invoke for himself.” By the end of the nineteenth century, three
states had adopted laws against domestic violence that made wife42
beating a punishable offense.
The feminist movement of the 1960s brought a heightened
attention to family violence, which motivated the establishment of
43
rape crisis centers and battered women’s shelters.
California
44
founded one of the first battered women’s shelters in 1964. The
34

Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence: III. New State and
Federal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1528 (1993) (citing
State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil.) 453, 456–57 (1868)).
35
See James Martin Truss, Comment, The Subjection of Women . . . Still: Unfulfilled
Promises of Protection for Women Victims of Domestic Violence, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1149,
1157 (1995).
36
Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on
an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1288 (2000).
37
Truss, supra note 35, at 1157 (citing Hand v. Hand, 133 N.W.2d 63, 68 (Iowa
1965)).
38
Tsai, supra note 36, at 1288.
39
Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil.) 453, 459 (1868).
40
See Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143 (1871).
41
Id. at 147.
42
Tsai, supra note 36, at 1289 (citing Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Domestic
Violence: The Criminal Justice Response 174–75 (James A. Inciardi ed., 2d ed.
1996)). Nine other states were also considering stronger laws against wife-beating.
Id.
43
Id. at 1290.
44
Id. (citing JEFFREY FAGAN, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE RESEARCH
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feminist movement was an integral part of the initial realization that
domestic violence had become a significant social problem.
“Feminists were vocal, organized, and effective in their efforts to
persuade the government that domestic violence was not
45
acceptable.”
It was also during this period that the phrase “domestic violence”
46
came to be understood as synonymous with wife abuse. The term
was previously used to refer to general violence such as sixties-era
47
ghetto riots or urban terrorism.
Government involvement in
domestic violence included the proliferation of new shelters,
intervention programs, and published studies. For example, “the first
batterer-intervention programs were created [in 1975],” conclusively
48
framing the domestic violence issue as “the man’s problem.”
A
variety of legislative and policy reforms were enacted in the 1980s,
including specialized prosecution units for domestic violence,
increased intervention programs, and protection orders that allowed
49
for improved access to emergency orders. Still, many viewed this
legislation as “an attack on the American family, and a means of
50
funding feminist causes.”
Despite this view, “states substantially expanded their laws on
51
domestic violence during the 1970s and 1980s.” The reforms also

REPORT: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND
LIMITS 6–9 (1996)).
45
Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 793 (2007).
46
Tsai, supra note 36, at 1290.
47
Id. (citing ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY
AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 194 (1987)).
48
Id. (citing PLECK, supra note 46, at 192). According to the United States
Department of Justice, eighty-five percent of domestic violence victims are women.
See Callie Marie Rennison, Bureau of Justice Statistics Crime Data Brief: Intimate Partner
Violence,
1993–2001,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUSTICE
(Feb.
2003),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf. Although the focus of this
Comment is to manifest the plight of women as victims of violence, this Comment
does not deny or minimize the existence of male victims. The author intends his use
of female pronouns throughout the Comment as gender inclusive and uses such
terms because victims are statistically more likely to be women. For a discussion on
heterosexual men as victims of domestic violence and bias in the application of
domestic violence laws, see Amanda J. Schmesser, Note, Real Men May Not Cry, But
They Are Victims of Domestic Violence: Bias in the Application of Domestic Violence Laws, 58
SYRACUSE L. REV. 171 (2007); see also Silver v. Silver, 903 A.2d 446 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2006).
49
Tsai, supra note 36, at 1290–91 (citing FAGAN, supra note 44, at 9).
50
Bernadette Dunn Sewell, Note, History of Abuse: Societal, Judicial, and Legislative
Responses to the Problem of Wife Beating, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 983, 999 (1989).
51
Ruth Colker, Marriage Mimicry: The Law of Domestic Violence, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1841, 1857 (2006).
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tended to occur in a piecemeal fashion, starting with protection and
relief for victims in marital relationships and then extending to other
52
people who appeared to be in a marriage-like relationship. Even
after instituting laws that criminalized domestic violence,
enforcement conduct remained inadequate, so legislatures instituted
53
mandatory arrest policies for domestic violence situations.
But
mandatory arrest policies do not assist women like S.P., who are not
victims of “domestic” violence arising from a relationship. As
demonstrated by the case of S.P., the protections offered by domestic
violence laws are not all-inclusive and leave some women
unprotected.
Today, all states enforce their domestic violence laws through
54
enhanced criminal penalties as well as civil protection orders. States
fall into four vastly different categories with respect to the protection
55
of adult victims of domestic violence. State domestic violence laws
may cover: (1) only individuals in opposite-sex relationships; (2)
individuals in a “dating relationship”; (3) individuals who live in the
56
same household; or (4) individuals in same-sex relationships. The
focus of this Comment predominantly involves the treatment of
individuals who live in the same “household” and those with a prior
dating relationship.
New Jersey responded to domestic violence by enacting the
PDVA, which offers broad protection to many of those who fall into
57
the aforementioned categories. The New Jersey Legislature passed
the PDVA “to assure victims of domestic violence the maximum
58
protection from abuse the law can provide.” A “victim of domestic
violence” includes any person “who is eighteen years of age or older
or who is an emancipated minor and who has been subjected to
domestic violence by a spouse, former spouse, or any other person
59
who is a present or former household member.” The statute does
not define the term “household member,” although New Jersey
60
courts have liberally construed the term.
Despite its liberal
52

Id.
Jane Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using The Stages of Change Model to Realize the
Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 314 (2011).
54
Colker, supra note 51, at 1857.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 1857–58.
57
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19(d) (West 2011).
58
Sperling v. Teplitsky, 683 A.2d 244, 246 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996)
(citations omitted).
59
§ 2C:25-19(d).
60
See Cesare v. Cesare, 713 A.2d 390, 393 (N.J. 1998).
53
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construction, the PDVA leaves women residing in community
61
housing unprotected by New Jersey law.
Domestic abuse pervades all social and economic levels, but
women of lower socio-economic status are at a higher risk of
62
becoming victims of domestic violence. Some studies even suggest
63
that domestic violence is a major cause of poverty. But poor women
who reside in boarding houses are not necessarily protected from
64
Despite substantial progress in legal
violence under the PDVA.
remedies for domestic violence victims of all economic levels in New
Jersey, the law does not provide victims of acquaintance and stranger
65
violence with the same protection and remedies. Therefore, New
Jersey’s domestic violence law is not overly inclusive, since it leaves
certain victims unprotected. Although S.P. was tragically victimized,
she was left vulnerable and unable to obtain a civil protection order
because it was questionable whether or not she was involved in a
66
domestic violence incident as defined by the PDVA.
III. CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS
The past several decades of domestic violence law reform have
focused on criminalizing domestic violence and thus remedying
67
domestic violence problems through criminal penalties.
Nevertheless, by 1993, every jurisdiction in the country had enacted
civil protection order laws pursuant to their domestic violence
68
statutes. One of the most commonly utilized remedies for domestic
abuse is a civil order of protection, which is an injunctive protection
order, often granted ex parte, that the court issues to impose
69
restrictions on a person’s future behavior. The order may prohibit
any contact between the parties, allow contact but forbid abusive
61

See infra Part V.
Elizabeth J. Thomas, Building a Statutory Shelter for Victims of Domestic Violence:
The United States Housing Act and Violence Against Women Act in Collaboration, 16 WASH.
U.J.L. & POL’Y 289, 293 (2004).
63
Id. (citing Joan Meier, Domestic Violence, Character, and Social Change in the
Welfare Reform Debate, 19 LAW & POL’Y 205, 206 (1997)).
64
See infra Part V.
65
See infra Part IV.
66
See also Sandoval v. Mendez, 521 A.2d 1168 (D.C. 1987) (holding that a woman
was not entitled to a civil protection order, despite that she used to live with her
attacker and was beaten in her own home). The court reasoned that the parties did
not share an intimate relationship and thus she had no right to a protective order.
Id. at 1169.
67
Stoever, supra note 53, at 305.
68
Id. at 306 (emphasis added).
69
Tsai, supra note 36, at 1292.
62
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behavior, or address issues such as mandated counseling, child
70
Given the choice between a
custody, visitation, and support.
criminal and civil remedy, victims frequently utilize the civil justice
system in their efforts to prevent violence because a civil protection
71
order is easier to obtain than a criminal protection order.
Scholars have advocated the use of civil protection orders as a
result of positive victim feedback, their proven effectiveness, and the
autonomy-promoting character that is associated with enhanced
72
safety. One study that measured the efficacy of protection orders
found that when a woman applied and qualified for a protection
73
order, she experienced a “rapid and significant decline in violence.”
Although both can be utilized to prevent future violence, a woman
must rely on criminal courts for protection when the law precludes
74
her from obtaining a civil protection order. Victims of violence or
sexual assault who cannot receive protection under domestic violence
laws can potentially receive protection under criminal laws such as
75
stalking or assault and battery. But a civil protection order offers
several basic advantages over a criminal order of protection, and,
consequently, civil protection orders are now the most frequently
76
used legal remedy to address intimate partner violence.
The comparative benefits offered by a civil protection order are
among the reasons that New Jersey should amend its laws to adopt
such orders as a remedy for those involved in non-intimate partner
77
violence. First, a permanent civil order of protection can be granted
78
more quickly than a criminal order of protection. Second, courts
79
apply a lower standard of proof : in most states, a victim must only
70

Id.
Stoever, supra note 53, at 308 (citing Susan Keilitz, Improving Judicial System
Responses to Domestic Violence: The Promises and Risks of Integrated Case Management and
Technology Solutions, in Handbook of Domestic Violence Intervention Strategies 147,
149 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 2002) (“finding that survivors are more likely to seek
relief from violence solely in the civil system through protection orders, as compared
to using the criminal justice system”).
72
Id. at 318–19.
73
Id. at 319 (citing Judith McFarlane et al., Protection Orders and Intimate Partner
Violence: An 18-Month Study of 150 Black, Hispanic, and White Women, 94 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 613, 613–18 (2004)).
74
See generally Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal Protection-Order
Coverage: A Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93 (2005) (contrasting domestic
violence civil protection orders from other types of protection orders).
75
Id. at 100.
76
See supra Part III.
77
See infra Part VI.
78
Smith, supra note 74, at 119.
79
See id.
71
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sustain proof by a preponderance of the evidence rather than proof
80
beyond a reasonable doubt. This allows a potential victim to more
easily establish that she may be in danger. Third, scholars argue that
81
civil protection orders empower the victim. In criminal cases, the
82
prosecutor will decide how to proceed, if at all. A civil protection
order allows a victim her choice of remedies and control over the
83
direction of her case. Fourth, civil protection orders are far more
84
Fifth, police immediately
comprehensive than criminal orders.
enforce temporary restraining orders, whereas criminal court orders
to not contact a victim can only be enforced via charges and
85
returning to court for a hearing.
Civil orders can provide relief in various forms, including
mandating child support or visitation, requiring an abuser to enter a
drug rehabilitation program, ordering an abuser to make certain
86
payments, or fashioning a remedy specific to the victim. But an
abuser who is subject to a civil protection order will not go to jail or
face any criminal punishment unless he later violates the order. This
may be important to those victims who may have been acquainted
with their abuser or share mutual friends. But most significantly, a
woman does not even have the option to utilize a civil protection
order if it is unavailable under the law.
Despite the benefits that civil protection orders offer, they have
been criticized. One criticism of protective orders concerns the
87
general inadequacy of protection orders to prevent further abuse.
Unfortunately, orders of protection alone may not be the most
effective remedy for preventing future violence in all cases. For
example, in 1996, one study found that sixty percent of orders of
protection were violated within one year, while another study
indicated that almost fifty percent of court-issued protection orders
88
were violated within two years. In addition, a third study found that
more than seventeen percent of victims killed in domestic incidents
89
had obtained orders of protection. Even law enforcement officials

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Id.
Id. at 120.
Id.
Id. at 120.
Smith, supra note 74, at 121.
Id.
Id.
Tsai, supra note 36, at 1292.
Id. at 1292.
Id.
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90

admit that “protection orders do not necessarily save lives.”
Nevertheless, states now use civil protection orders expansively, and
New Jersey should do so by allowing a woman to obtain a civil
protection order in situations involving violence instigated by an
91
acquaintance or a stranger.
A. Maryland’s Civil Protection Order Statute
Several states, like Maryland, have entirely removed the
relationship requirement necessary for a potential victim to obtain a
92
civil protection order. Such states allow any person who can prove
the commission of a requisite act of abuse and a need for future
protection to obtain a civil protection order without proving the
93
existence of a relationship with the abuser. States offering these
civil protective orders utilize separate statutes to provide relief for
domestic violence under traditional relationship definitions as
opposed to for victims of violence committed by an acquaintance or
94
stranger. Although these alternative civil protection orders may not
confer all of the benefits of a domestic violence protective order, they
do allow a woman to get a restraining order if she faces potential
95
danger. Under Maryland law, a petitioner may seek relief by filing a
petition with the court that alleges the commission of any of the
following acts against the petitioner by the respondent, if the act
occurred within 30 days before the filing of the petition:
(1) an act that causes serious bodily harm; (2) an act that
places the petitioner in fear of imminent serious bodily harm;
(3) assault in any degree; (4) rape or sexual offense under
section 3-303 through section 3-308 of the Criminal Law
Article or attempted rape or sexual offense in any
degree; (5) false imprisonment; (6) harassment under
section 3-803 of the Criminal Law Article; (7) stalking
under section 3-802 of the Criminal Law Article;
(8) trespass under Title 6, Subtitle 4 of the Criminal Law
Article; or (9) malicious destruction of property under

90

Id.
See id.
92
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC., § 3-1503 (2009).
93
See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. 12-1809 (2004) (allowing “any person” to obtain an
injunction against another for acts of harassment); see also 740 ILL. COMP. STAT.
22/201 (West 2003) (allowing victims of sex crimes to obtain orders of protection
regardless of the relationship to the attacker, although not containing the same
provisions as domestic violence protection orders).
94
See id.
95
See supra note 92.
91
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96

section 6-301 of the Criminal Law Article.
If a Maryland judge finds that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the accused has committed, and is likely to commit in the
future, an act specified in section 3-1503(a), the judge may issue a
97
temporary peace order to protect the petitioner. The temporary
peace order may include the following relief:
(i) Order the respondent to refrain from committing or
threatening to commit an act specified in § 3-1503(a) of this
subtitle against the petitioner; (ii) Order the respondent to
refrain from contacting, attempting to contact, or harassing
the petitioner; (iii) Order the respondent to refrain from
entering the residence of the petitioner; and (iv) Order the
respondent to remain away from the place of employment,
98
school, or temporary residence of the petitioner.
Consequently, such an array of statutory provisions enables
99
Maryland citizens to seek protection from abusive relationships.
Where an abusive relationship exists between a victim and a
neighbor, co-worker, or acquaintance, that victim may petition for
interim, temporary, ex parte, or final peace orders, issued by a

96

MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC., § 3-1503 (West 2009) (emphasis added).
In this section, “stalking” means a malicious course of conduct that
includes approaching or pursuing another where the person intends to
place or knows or reasonably should have known the conduct would
place another in reasonable fear: (1)(i) of serious bodily injury; (ii) of
an assault in any degree; (iii) of rape or sexual offense as defined by §§
3-303 through 3-308 of this title or attempted rape or sexual offense in
any degree; (iv) of false imprisonment; or (v) of death.
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW. § 3-802 (West 2011). In this section, “harassment” means
that
[a] person may not follow another in or about a public place or
maliciously engage in a course of conduct that alarms or seriously
annoys the other: (1) with the intent to harass, alarm, or annoy the
other; (2) after receiving a reasonable warning or request to stop by or
on behalf of the other; and (3) without a legal purpose.
§ 3-803.
97
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.,§ 3-1504(a)(1). Maryland created an
alternative statute to limit the relief available to victims not in a domestic violence
relationship. For example, a final peace order expires after only six months versus
one year for a protective order. § 3-1505(f). Additionally, a protective order can
lead to an order granting exclusive use and possession of a home or personal
property while a peace order cannot. § 3-1505(d)(1). These restrictions thus
minimize the potential damage from the anticipated increased number of frivolous
or even meritorious but less serious filings, as manifested by situations involving
verbal harassment or physical violence. Such restrictions aim to limit system-wide
abuse while still providing victims with the requisite protection.
98
§ 3-1504(a)(2).
99
See id.
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commissioner or judge of a district court.
S.P. never met her
attacker before the morning that she was raped, she had only passed
101
him on the stairwell several days prior. If she lived in Maryland, her
unfamiliarity with her attacker would not have been a factor in her
ability to obtain a protective order. But she was a resident of New
Jersey, and thus was unable to immediately obtain a civil protection
order.
IV. THE NEW JERSEY PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT OF
102
1991
The Protection of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA or the Act) was
designed to protect victims of domestic violence and to provide
103
uniformity in adjudicating each claim.
Under this New Jersey
statute:
“domestic violence” means the occurrence of one or more
of the following acts inflicted upon a person protected
under this act by an adult or an emancipated minor: (1)
homicide; (2) assault; (3) terroristic threats; (4)
kidnapping; (5) criminal restraint; (6) false imprisonment;
(7) sexual assault; (8) criminal sexual contact; (9) lewdness;
(10) criminal mischief; (11) burglary; (12) criminal
104
trespass; (13) harassment; or (14) stalking.
Even when a victim proves the occurrence of a particular abusive
act under the statute, the court must still inquire into the relationship
between the parties to determine whether the PDVA applies to a
105
As aforementioned, the PDVA limits protection
particular victim.
to those victimized by a spouse, former spouse, or any other person
106
A “victim of
who is a present or former household member.
domestic violence” also includes victims of abuse by a person with
107
whom the victim has had a past dating relationship.
The legislature has made several declarations regarding
domestic violence:
that domestic violence is a serious crime against society; that
there are thousands of persons in New Jersey who are
100

Joshua Friedman and Gary Norman, Protecting the Family Pet: The New Face of
Maryland Domestic Violence Protective Orders, 40 U. BALT. L.F. 81, 90 (2009).
101
S.P. v. Newark Police Dept., 52 A.3d 178, 181 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).
102
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-17–35 (West 2011).
103
D.C. v. F.R., 670 A.2d 51, 55 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
104
§ 2C:25-19(a).
105
See id.
106
§ 2C:25-19(d).
107
Id.
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regularly beaten, tortured and in some cases even killed by
their spouses or cohabitants; that a significant number of
women who are assaulted are pregnant; that victims of
domestic violence come from all social and economic
backgrounds and ethnic groups; that there is a positive
correlation between spousal abuse and child abuse; and
that children, even when they are not themselves physically
assaulted, suffer deep and lasting emotional effects from
108
exposure to domestic violence.
“It is therefore, the intent of the legislature to assure the victims
of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law
109
can provide.” Accordingly, the PDVA affords greater protection for
potential victims of domestic violence than is generally given to
110
victims of crimes committed by strangers.
In order to achieve this goal, the PDVA authorizes courts to issue
restraining orders to promote the safety of domestic violence
111
victims. To that end, the PDVA affords a plaintiff the opportunity
112
to seek emergency ex parte relief in the form of a TRO. A TRO is
only available pursuant to a violation of the PDVA, specifically the
113
commission of one of the fourteen abusive acts listed above.
A
TRO is typically granted by a judge of the Family Part of the Superior
Court when necessary to protect the life, health, or well-being of a
114
victim on whose behalf the relief is sought.
The court rules
generally require that an applicant for a TRO appear personally
before a judge, but if it appears that the applicant is in danger of
domestic violence, the judge has discretion to order emergency ex
115
parte relief in the form of a TRO, as authorized by the PDVA. The
emergency relief available under a TRO includes all relief available to
a victim at a final hearing under the PDVA, together with any other
appropriate relief, and it remains in effect until the court takes
116
further action.
Emergency relief pursuant to a TRO may include forbidding the
defendant from returning to the scene of the domestic violence,
108

§ 2C:25-18.
Id.; State v. Volpini, 677 A.2d 780, 785 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996);
Sperling v. Teplitsky, 683 A.2d 244, 246 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996).
110
S.Z. v. M.C., 11 A.3d 404, 406 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011).
111
State v. Dispoto, 913 A.2d 791, 798 (N.J. 2007).
112
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(a) (West 2011).
113
Id.
114
§ 2C:25-28(f).
115
§ 2C:25-28(g); N.J. CT. R. 5:7A(a).
116
§ 2C:25-28(g).
109
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enjoining the defendant from possessing any firearm or other
117
weapon, or any other appropriate relief. Perhaps most importantly,
a judge can issue a TRO through electronic communication without
the physical presence of the applicant, thus specifically aiding women
118
who feel they are in imminent danger.
A TRO “may issue if the
judge is satisfied that exigent circumstances exist that are sufficient to
excuse the failure of the applicant to appear personally and that
119
sufficient grounds for granting the application have been shown.”
This protection, however, is solely contingent on a woman’s
120
involvement in an incident of “domestic violence.”
Thus, it is
imperative to examine when a woman is considered a “household
member” in New Jersey under the PDVA. S.P. v. City of Newark,
recently decided by the Appellate Division, is particularly illustrative
in analyzing the razor-thin difference between who is a “household
121
If a potential victim is deemed a
member” and who is not.
“household member,” she can obtain a TRO under the PDVA. But if
she is not, no such recourse is available to her.
V. S.P. V. CITY OF NEWARK: WHO IS A “HOUSEHOLD MEMBER”?
S.P. was renting a room at a boarding house located on Milford
122
Avenue in the City of Newark, New Jersey. She had moved into that
residence in early February of 2008 and her room was located directly
123
across the hall from a man who she had not met, named Santiago.
124
The two shared a kitchen and a bathroom at the end of the hall. In
the few weeks that S.P. lived there, the two had never exchanged
125
words or been formally introduced.
They had one uneventful
126
“interaction” in which they had passed each other in the stairwell.
Thus, S.P. and Santiago were essentially strangers prior to February
127
17, 2008.
Their relationship was similar to that of college dorm
117

§§ 2C:25-21(d), 2C:39-1(r).
N.J. CT. R. 5:7A(b)–(c).
119
Id.
120
See § 2C:25-19(d).
121
S.P. v. Newark Police Dept., 52 A.3d 178 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).
122
Id. at 180. A boarding house is a house in which the residents rent a room,
sometimes for extended periods of weeks, months, or years. See id. The common
parts of the house, such as a bathroom and kitchen, may be shared by the residents.
See id. Thus, a boarding house is not considered one residence, but rather several
residences within a complex, which is more akin to an apartment-building setting.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
118
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residents who live across the hall from one another, but who have not
been formally introduced.
As S.P. left her room to go to the bathroom after midnight on
128
February 17, 2008, Santiago asked her if she wanted to have a drink.
129
Santiago
S.P. declined and continued towards the bathroom.
confronted S.P. when she left the bathroom, groping her right breast
130
and buttocks and telling her that he wanted to have sex.
S.P.
131
Undeterred,
pushed him away and locked herself in her room.
132
Santiago tried to open her locked door. S.P. then called the police
133
Police
twice in an attempt to seek protection from Santiago.
officers arrived after some delay, and S.P. met them at the front door
to explain what happened to her, visually demonstrating to the police
134
officers how Santiago had groped her.
Santiago told the officers
that he did not know S.P., and he denied that they had an intimate
135
relationship.
Because it was unclear whether this was a domestic
violence situation, S.P. was not informed of her right to obtain a TRO
136
under the PDVA.
137
The police officers left without making an arrest. They merely
ordered Santiago to stay away from S.P. and instructed S.P. to call the
138
police if he harassed her again. S.P. was resigned to return to her
139
room with potential danger lurking just across the hall. S.P. left her
room to take a shower the next morning, about ten hours after the
140
police had left.
As she attempted to exit the bathroom, she was
141
Santiago brutally
confronted by a lurking figure in the doorway.
142
attacked S.P., raping her in the hallway. He then dragged her into

128

S.P., 52 A.3d at 180.
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
S.P., 52 A.3d at 181.
135
Id.
136
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-23 (West 2011) mandates that a law enforcement
officer shall disseminate and explain to the victim the following written notice: “You
have the right to go to court to get an order called a temporary restraining order,
also called a TRO, which may protect you from more abuse by your attacker. The
officer who handed you this card can tell you how to get a TRO.”
137
S.P., 52 A.3d at 181.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
129
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143

his room and continued to rape her.
S.P. eventually escaped and
144
She subsequently filed a
ran downstairs and out of the building.
civil lawsuit on January 8, 2010, against Santiago, the landlord of the
boarding house, Essex County (County), New Jersey (State), and the
City of Newark (City or Newark). She brought claims under the
PDVA, arguing that the defendants were negligent, careless, and
reckless in their failure to arrest and remove Santiago from the
145
premises the night before the rape had occurred.
A critical inquiry in determining S.P.’s potential legal recourse
against her landlord, the City, the County, and the State is whether
Santiago and S.P. were “household members” under the PDVA. That
answer informs whether or not Santiago should have been arrested
146
pursuant to New Jersey’s mandatory domestic violence arrest laws.
If S.P. and Santiago were considered “household members” under
the PDVA, then in addition to the protection of a mandatory arrest,
S.P. would have been able to seek a protection order, thereby
potentially decreasing her exposure to violence, even in the absence
of the arrest of Santiago or following any post-arrest release. The City
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the PDVA did not
147
apply to the factual circumstances of the case.
Among its
arguments, the City contended that S.P. and Santiago were not
148
“household members” under the PDVA. In an order dated May 27,
149
2011, the trial court denied the City’s motion.
The trial court concluded that Santiago and S.P. were household
150
members and thus the PDVA was applicable.
The court held that
there was “constancy” in the “relationship” between S.P. and Santiago
because of the “close proximity of the parties’ rooms and the reality
of living in a boarding house, which necessitates interaction between
151
the parties.” The court also held that S.P. and Santiago satisfied the
over-night stay at each other’s residence requirement because they

143

S.P., 52 A.3d at 181.
Id.
145
Id.
146
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21(a) (West 2011) (requiring that a police officer
shall make an arrest if he or she “finds probable cause to believe that domestic
violence has occurred” and “[t]he victim exhibits signs of injury caused by an act of
domestic violence”).
147
S.P., 52 A.3d at 181.
148
Id. at 181–82.
149
Id. at 182.
150
Id.
151
Id.
144
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152

lived on the same floor of a boarding house.
The court further
held that S.P. and Santiago stored items at each other’s residence
153
The City
because they shared a bathroom and common areas.
subsequently filed a motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal
154
from the denial of summary judgment.
The Appellate Division,
recognizing the importance of this issue, granted the motion on July
155
25, 2011.
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s holding,
following the trial court’s rationale in concluding that S.P. and
156
Santiago were household members under the PDVA.
The
Appellate Division focused on the parties’ living arrangement and
shared common areas, assuming that “[c]rossing paths and
157
interacting would be inevitable in this type of living arrangement.”
The Appellate Division was careful to warn, however, that “we do not
conclude that all boarders in a rooming house are household
158
members.” Thus, the holding was extremely narrow, limited to the
specific circumstances of this case which involved two parties living
across the hall from each other. Furthermore, because it was
questionable whether this was a domestic violence situation, the
police did not even inform S.P. of her right to obtain a TRO, as
159
mandated under the PDVA.
A review of New Jersey precedent
involving the interpretation of “household member” reveals that,
although liberally construed, many potential victims will not qualify
160
for relief under the PDVA.
“Violence-between-strangers” cases fall in the broader category
of criminal acts by strangers and are not typically considered within
161
the confines of the PDVA. S.P. and Santiago had not exchanged a
single word prior to the incident, and there was no indication that
162
the two shared a prior relationship.
The two thus lacked the
relationship criteria typically necessary for a court to find a
152

Id.
S.P., 52 A.3d at 182.
154
Id. at 183.
155
Id. at 180.
156
Id. at 188. The Appellate Division’s holding on the “household member” issue
was not dispositive, as the court held for Newark on other grounds.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-23.
160
See infra Part V.A.
161
See Hamilton v. Ali, 795 A.2d 929, 934 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001) (holding,
contrary to precedent, that acquaintances were “household members” as defined by
the PDVA).
162
S.P., 52 A.3d at 180.
153
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163

“household member” relationship under New Jersey case law.
Although it was perhaps a stretch to consider S.P. and Santiago
“household members,” the Appellate Division surprisingly relied
solely on the fact that the parties lived on the same floor to find that
164
an interaction at some point was inevitable.
The court explained
that since they were the only two living on the floor, S.P. would have
become naturally aware that they shared a living space, despite that
165
she hadn’t in the several weeks since she had moved in.
Prior to the Appellate Division’s holding, all such reported New
Jersey cases that found the victim was a “household member”
involved violence perpetrated by someone who was, at the very least,
166
an acquaintance of the victim. Thus, the S.P. decision is an outlier.
In fact, such a holding is most likely borne from the judiciary’s own
sense that a strict interpretation of the law would fail to do justice for
S.P. Such an intuition accentuates the need for a uniform system
change via a new alternative statute so that protection does not
depend on the sympathy of an individual judge. S.P. was in a highly
vulnerable position, living right across the hall from a man who had
just assaulted her and received only a verbal warning after she
167
notified the police of his abuse.
But she was unable to obtain
protection because it was unclear whether she was a victim of
domestic violence—a determination that would have been rendered
moot had New Jersey law allowed for the issuance of civil protection
orders. This distinction exposes the fatal flaw in New Jersey’s current
protection-order statutes, manifesting the necessity for change.
A. The New Jersey Judiciary’s Interpretation of “household member”
A frequently litigated issue involving the interpretation of the
PDVA is whether two parties constitute “household members” under
the PDVA. This interpretation is especially important to women, like
S.P., who seek protection under the Act. In 1994, the legislature
changed the terminology in the statute from “cohabitant” to
“household member” to expand the scope of relief under the
168
PDVA.
What follows is an analysis of cases that illustrate the fact
that although New Jersey courts have liberally construed the
definition of “household member,” such an interpretation still leaves
163
164
165
166
167
168

See infra Part V.A.
S.P., 52 A.3d at 188.
Id.
See Hamilton v. Ali, 795 A.2d 929, 934 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001).
S.P., 52 A.3d at 181.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25–18 (West 2011).
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many women who are in imminent danger unprotected under New
Jersey’s civil laws.
1. Cases finding “household-member” status without
intimate relationship
Hamilton v. Ali offers a rare example of a case in which a New
Jersey court held that a relationship between mere acquaintances
qualified as one between “household members” and thus the case fell
169
under the jurisdiction of the PDVA. In Hamilton, the court decided
170
The
whether college dorm mates were of the same “household.”
court held that the parties were household members pursuant to the
PDVA, ruling that the
plaintiff and defendant each has separate sleeping quarters
but must interact on a frequent basis and because the
qualities and characteristics of their relationship (i.e. daily
contact for one month with the potential for one academic
year, each having a key to the suite entrance, and sharing
the bathroom and common area) placed plaintiff in a more
susceptible position for abusive and controlling behavior in
171
the hands of the defendant.
The Hamilton court cited Desiato v. Abbott, which set forth the
following criteria to be applied on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether there exists a “family-like setting” within the meaning of the
PDVA: (1) constancy of the relationship; (2) over-night stays at each
other’s residence; (3) personalty items such as jewelry, clothing, and
personal grooming effects stored at each other’s residences; (4)
shared property arrangements, such as automobile usage, access to
each other’s bank accounts, and one mailing address for billing and
other legal purposes; and (5) familiarity with each other’s siblings
and parents socially in dining and/or entertainment activities
together, and/or attendance together at extended family functions
172
such as weddings.
Hamilton’s decision that college dorm mates can qualify as
household members under the PDVA supports the holding that S.P.
169

Hamilton, 795 A.2d at 934.
Id. at 933.
171
Id.
172
See Desiato v. Abbott, 617 A.2d 678, 680 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992). The
Hamilton court also relied on the Appellate Division’s interpretation of a durational
requirement set forth in Bryant v. Burnett, 624 A.2d 584, 585•86 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div.), cert. denied, 134 N.J. 478 (1993). The Bryant court held that a three-month time
period in which the parties resided together was sufficient to constitute a “household
member” relationship. Id. at 587.
170
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and Santiago were household members. But no New Jersey court,
prior to S.P., had extended the interpretation of “household
member” to protect a victim from the violent actions of an
acquaintance or stranger with whom the victim had not, until then,
interacted. This is not surprising, considering that while the PDVA
protects victims from domestic violence by intimate partners,
acquaintance-based violence has historically been the province of the
173
state’s criminal laws.
Applying the Hamilton criteria to the aforementioned facts of
S.P. v. Newark, one could argue that the courts wrongly decided that
S.P. and Santiago were “household members.” The first factor—
constancy of the relationship—could not be established because the
174
parties only crossed paths once in a three-week period. The second
factor—overnight stays at each other’s residence—did not necessarily
175
occur. The boarding house the two shared was a combination of
several residences within a complex, akin to an apartment-building
176
The third factor—having personalty items at each other’s
setting.
177
residence—was certainly not present. The fourth—shared property
178
Finally, S.P. and Santiago did not
arrangements—did not exist.
even know each other and thus had no familiarity with each other’s
179
families, as required by the fifth factor.
Thus, it is likely that S.P.
should not have qualified as a household member under these
factors. In fact, the Hamilton court noted that the case “certainly
involved more than assaultive conduct between casual friends or
180
relative strangers.”
But S.P. and Santiago were relative strangers
181
when Santiago assaulted S.P.
Nevertheless, it was the analysis of these very factors that led the
Appellate Division to affirm the trial court’s conclusion that S.P. was a
182
household member.
But the S.P. ruling is an outlier because
Hamilton and S.P. are distinguishable. The shared common area is
the only similarity between Hamilton and S.P. Indeed, Judge
Fitzgerald of the Court of Appeals of Michigan even opined that to
extend domestic violence to college roommates, a similar scenario,
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182

See supra Part III.
S.P. v. Newark Police Dept., 52 A.3d 178, 180 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hamilton v. Ali, 795 A.2d 929, 933 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001).
See supra Part V.
S.P., 52 A.3d at 178.
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183

would be “absurd.” The “relationship” shared by S.P. and Santiago
was much less significant than the relationship shared by college
roommates.
In S.Z. v. M.C., the Appellate Division similarly adopted a broad
definition of “household member” when it reversed the trial court’s
determination that the defendant, a “visitor” who resided in the
plaintiff’s home for seven months, was not a “household member”
184
under the PDVA.
The Appellate Division held that although the
two men never had a traditional familial, romantic, or sexual
relationship, neither their incompatible sexual orientations nor the
timeframes involved defeated jurisdiction; the former male
houseguest did fall within the definition of a “household member”
185
under the Act.
The S.Z. court focused on the qualities and
characteristics of the parties’ relationship in holding that the guest
186
was a “household member.”
Thus, the court decided that the
187
As such, this case is also
parties’ relationship was determinative.
distinguishable from S.P. In S.Z., the parties’ relationship went well
188
beyond that of acquaintances. Specifically, the parties in S.Z. lived
189
By contrast, Santiago and
under the same roof for seven months.
S.P. lived in the same boarding house for just three weeks and had
190
never actually met. Thus, S.P. can be distinguished from even those
cases in which the court adopted the most liberal interpretation of
“household member” under the PDVA. The “outlier-nature” of the
S.P. decision further reinforces the need for New Jersey to enact a
191
civil statute to implement the use of civil protection orders.
2. Cases finding no “household member” status
New Jersey courts have liberally construed the term “household
192
member” to offer broad protection under the PDVA.
Still, this
183

In re Lovell, 572 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Mich. App. 1997) (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
S.Z. v. M.C., 11 A.3d 404, 407 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011).
185
Id. at 405.
186
Id.
187
See also D.A.G. v. P.H., No. FV-13-1862-10, 2011 WL 5864553, at *5 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. Nov. 23, 2011) (affirming the trial court’s issuance of a restraining
order pursuant to the PDVA, holding that even though the two brothers were raised
in different homes from birth, their development of a familial relationship as adults
qualified them as former “household members” and thus subjected them to the
jurisdiction of the PDVA).
188
S.Z., 11 A.3d at 405.
189
Id.
190
S.P. v. Newark Police Dept., 52 A.3d 178, 180 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).
191
S.P., 52 A.3d at 178.
192
See supra Part V.A.1.
184
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interpretation does not reach all women and thus leaves many
unnecessarily susceptible to harm. Despite the judiciary’s liberal
interpretation of the term “household member” in some cases, the
Appellate Division, in Smith v. Moore, instructed that “there are
rational limits to this very expansive definition of a victim of domestic
193
These rational limits are borne out by the recognition
violence.”
that the PDVA does not apply to every relationship in which a
common roof is shared. The Smith court narrowly interpreted the
PDVA in analyzing an incident that arose between two former
194
household members. The court justified its holding as necessary to
curb the increased number of domestic violence cases brought before
195
the court.
In Smith, the victim and her harasser previously shared a home
on the weekends in the summer of 1995—almost a year before she
196
sought a restraining order.
The defendant appealed the final
restraining order (FRO) entered pursuant to the PDVA. The order
was based on a series of harassing phone calls allegedly made by the
197
defendant from November 1995 through April 1996.
The Smith
court concluded that the trial court judge did not have jurisdiction
under the PDVA to enter a restraining order since the parties did not
share the requisite domestic relationship to establish jurisdiction
198
under the PDVA.
Indeed, New Jersey courts are only allowed to
199
issue civil protection orders pursuant to the PDVA.
The Smith court, like the Desiato court before it, limited its
application of the PDVA to “violence that occurs in a family or family200
like setting.”
Again, this rationale does not portend a favorable
result for a woman in a situation similar to the one in which S.P.
found herself. Courts extend PDVA protection to vulnerable persons
who are placed “in a more susceptible position for abusive and
controlling behavior” by virtue of the underlying domestic
201
But S.P. had been placed in a susceptible position
relationship.
solely by virtue of her residence, not an underlying domestic

193

Smith v. Moore, 689 A.2d 145, 147 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); see also
Jutchenko v. Jutchenko, 660 A.2d 1267 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
194
Smith, 689 A.2d at 147.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-4(a).
198
Smith, 689 A.2d at 146.
199
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-17–35 (West 2011).
200
Smith, 689 A.2d at 146.
201
Hamilton v. Ali, 795 A.2d 929, 934 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001).
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202

relationship. Thus, a narrow interpretation of the PDVA may have
grave consequences for women in a situation similar to S.P. The
plaintiff in Smith sought a civil protection order to prevent the
defendant from going to her house. This request certainly seemed
understandable given the facts, but the court correctly held that the
203
PDVA does not afford a potential victim such protection.
3. Women susceptible to imminent violence
Coleman v. Roman provides an instructive analysis on how New
Jersey courts decide whether parties are household members under
204
the PDVA.
The Coleman court examines the subtle differences in
205
approaches taken in prior decisions.
Jutchenko looks forward in time, and focuses on whether the
former relationship “provides a special opportunity” for
domestic violence, thus triggering the need for protection
and prevention in the future. Tribuzio to some extent looks
backward, and focuses on whether the domestic violence
was related to and arose out of the past domestic
relationship. The approaches are complementary. Either
kind of case can implicate the Act’s remedial goals. Put
another way, a court must inquire whether the parties have
been so entangled, emotionally or physically—or they will be
in the future—that the court should invoke the Act to protect
206
the plaintiff and prevent future violence.
The court explicitly recognizes that the PDVA should protect a
woman at risk for potential future violence based on a “continuing,
207
entangled relationship.” S.P.’s attacker all but assured her that the
208
But the Coleman
two would be physically entangled in the future.
court makes this assertion under the predicate of a former
209
relationship shared between parties.
There is no common-sense
rationale to recognize a distinction between one who is susceptible to
danger based on a former relationship as opposed to one who is
susceptible based on a living arrangement. Surely the legislature
202

See supra Part V.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-17–35.
204
Coleman v. Romano, 908 A.2d 254 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2006).
205
See Jutchenko v. Jutchenko, 660 A.2d 1267 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995)
(finding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide the matter under the PDVA
since the two parties had not resided in the same household for twenty years); see also
Tribuzio v. Roder, 813 A.2d 1210 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
206
Coleman, 908 A.2d at 259.
207
Id.
208
S.P. v. Newark Police Dept., 52 A.3d 178, 180 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).
209
Coleman, 908 A.2d at 259.
203
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could not think that those in the latter circumstance are any less
worthy of protection under New Jersey law. It may be true that such
protection is not warranted pursuant to an Act that protects against
domestic violence. But it seems illogical and unjust to not afford a
woman who is in imminent danger protection via an alternative
210
statute.
B. Other Jurisdictions Interpret “household member” Similarly
An examination of other states’ interpretations of “household
member” reveals that S.P. would likely not be considered a household
member in any jurisdiction pursuant to other domestic violence laws.
In comparison with other jurisdictions, New Jersey affords protection
to a relatively wide range of victims under its PDVA, although even
under its law, victims of acquaintance and stranger violence may not
obtain a civil protection order due to the relationship requirement.
What follows is an examination of domestic violence cases in different
states across the country, including an analysis of the S.P. facts under
the various case holdings. Specifically, this Comment will compare
New Jersey’s precedent with cases decided in California, Minnesota,
Iowa, and Kentucky.
In the particularly illustrative California case of O’Kane v. Irvine,
an appellate court reversed the trial court’s imposition of a domestic
violence restraining order under similar circumstances to those in
211
S.P. There, as in S.P., the defendant leased a bedroom in a house
212
cohabitated by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff and defendant shared
213
common areas including the bathroom, kitchen, and living room.
Additionally, the parties did not have a prior relationship before
214
entering into their individual leasing agreements. After a few weeks
of living in the same house, the two got into an altercation, and the
215
The plaintiff
police were called, but they made no arrest.
subsequently obtained a TRO by alleging that the defendant had hit
216
her.

210

See infra Part VI. An alternative statute for non-intimate partner violence has
become a necessity for potential victims such as S.P. An alternative statute is
necessary because at its most liberal interpretation, the term “household member”
does not afford many potential victims protection under the PDVA.
211
O’Kane v. Irving, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 549, 552 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
212
Id. at 550.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id.
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California domestic violence law protects “cohabitants.”
The
California statute defines a “cohabitant” as “a person who regularly
218
resides in the household.”
The California courts define
“household” as “a collection of persons, whether related or not, who
live together as a group or unit of permanent or domestic character,
with one head, under one roof, or within a common curtilage, who
direct their attention toward a common goal consisting of their
219
mutual interests.”
But the court concluded that California’s
domestic violence laws were inapplicable to two parties living in
220
separate rooms and sharing common areas.
Because the parties
were not previously acquainted, were connected “wholly by
happenstance,” and did not live together as a group with a common
goal, the court reversed the TRO as outside the jurisdiction of the
221
domestic violence law.
Similarly, S.P. and Santiago were not
previously acquainted and formed their “relationship” solely by
happenstance. This holding illustrates the ambiguity of determining
who qualifies as a “household member.”
A Minnesota case, Elmasry v. Verdin, also involved facts that were
similar to those in S.P. The case involved two parties who lived
222
together in a duplex.
The respondent paid rent to the petitioner
223
on a month-to-month basis. The petitioner considered their shared
relationship as one between “housemates” since they were not
224
The unit did not contain any locked or
romantically involved.
225
secured rooms. Soon after moving in, the respondent’s actions and
behavior became increasingly aggressive and verbally abusive, causing
226
the petitioner to call the police. The trial court felt that the dispute
227
was a landlord-tenant matter and not one of domestic violence. But
the appellate court reversed, holding that because the parties shared
common living areas of the duplex, they were “residing together,”
and therefore met the definition of “household members” under
228
Minnesota’s domestic violence act.
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228

CAL. FAM. CODE § 6209 (West 2011).
Id.
O’Kane, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 552.
Id.
Id.
Elmasry v. Verdin, 727 N.W.2d 163, 164 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 164.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Elmasry, 727 N.W.2d at 166.
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The Elmasry decision would seem to include, under Minnesota
domestic violence law, the type of relationship that S.P. and Santiago
shared. But the real significance of Elmasry is that the court
suggested that had the appellant and respondent lived in separate,
self-contained units, with secured and locked areas, the trial court
“might have been correct in concluding that respondent was merely
229
appellant’s tenant and that the two did not reside together.” This
characterization describes the living situation in S.P. and that of
apartment complexes and hotels.
The Iowa Supreme Court has adopted a framework to determine
whether a couple is cohabiting for the purposes of criminal law
230
enforcement of domestic abuse assault.
Iowa courts consider six
factors in making such a determination: (1) sexual relations between
the parties while sharing the same living quarters; (2) sharing of
income or expenses; (3) joint use or ownership of property; (4)
whether the parties hold themselves out as husband and wife; (5) the
continuity of the relationship; and (6) the length of the
231
relationship.
In State v. Kellogg, an unmarried man and woman had ended
their intimate relationship but remained roommates, living together
232
in separate bedrooms.
Kellogg was charged with domestic abuse
assault after he kicked his former companion with spurred boots and
233
hit her, leaving her with “bruises, scabs, black eyes, and swelling.”
But since the judge had given an overly broad jury instruction under
which “mere roommates” could obtain statutory protection, the Iowa
Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, thus leaving
234
his victim with no protection under the domestic violence law. By
contrast, Santiago and S.P. were separated by a hallway and did not
have access to each other’s apartments.
Lastly, in Barnett v. Wiley, the Kentucky Supreme Court quoted
with approval a treatise explaining that the purpose of its domestic
violence statute was to “protect victims from harm caused by the
person whose intimate physical relationship to the victim increases
the danger of harm, either because the parties live in physical
proximity or because the relationship is one whose intimacy may

229
230
231
232
233
234

Id. at 166.
State v. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d 514 (Iowa 1996).
Colker, supra note 51, at 1857 (citing Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d at 518).
Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d at 515.
Id.
Id.

TAMBURRI (DO NOT DELETE)

1068

5/28/2013 1:58 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1041

235

disable the victim from seeking protection.”
This interpretation
would seem to offer a victim in S.P.’s situation the possibility of
receiving protection under the PDVA. Nevertheless, New Jersey does
not typically afford that status where there is a lack of a prior
236
relationship. Therefore, despite the seemingly inclusive definition
put forth in Barnett, a civil protection order will often be unavailable
to a party solely on the basis of living in the same boarding house as
her potential attacker, unless the court equates a boarding house
237
with a household.
To the extent the New Jersey Appellate Division looks to other
states for guidance in interpreting the “household member”
requirement, the preceding cases suggest that many potential victims
may not be deemed a “household member” entitled to protection
under the PDVA, even given the recent holding in S.P. Domestic
violence statutes are not construed broadly enough to protect women
who may not be involved in a traditional relationship with a
defendant, even under the “household member” criteria. The
question thus remains: How can New Jersey protect women who do
not fall within the jurisdiction of the PDVA from imminent harm?
VI. WHAT ACTION SHOULD THE NEW JERSEY LEGISLATURE TAKE?
A CALL FOR REFORM
If the legislature fails to change the status quo, civil protective
orders will remain under-inclusive because they are available only for
incidents that count as “domestic violence,” or violence between
specific categories of people not including strangers, and even
238
excluding many acquaintances.
New Jersey law governing civil
protection orders is inadequate. A woman must be given the
opportunity to use an alternative-remedy statute such as a civil
protection order as a sword, rather than a shield. New Jersey has two
options to improve its law. It can either expand the PDVA’s
definition of “household member” or draft an alternative remedy
statute to protect women from non-intimate violence.

235

Barnett v. Wiley, 103 S.W.3d 17, 19 (Ky. 2003) (quoting 15 Louise E. Graham
& James E. Keller, KENTUCKY PRACTICE: DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW § 5.1, at 107 (2d ed.
1997)).
236
See Coleman v. Romano, 908 A.2d 254, 259 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2006).
237
See Hamilton v. Ali, 795 A.2d 929, 934 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001) (holding,
contrary to precedent, that acquaintances were “household members” as defined by
the PDVA).
238
See supra Part III.
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A. Expand the Definition of “household member” Under the PDVA
The first option for the legislature is to amend the language of
“household member” to make it more expansive and thus include
women who share a roof with their abuser. This definition would
include situations in which two parties share a “common-area.” Such
an interpretation would inevitably include boarding house,
apartment, and condominium-building dwellers living in separate
apartments, and perhaps even hotel guests in separate rooms. Even
laundry rooms, exercise rooms, storage areas, pools, and locker
rooms represent examples of spatial areas that have the potential to
bring residents under a common roof into contact with each other.
Occupants of these shared facilities would be protected under an
amendment to the PDVA, because they represent areas in which
victims of prior violence by an acquaintance or stranger may be
particularly vulnerable to repeated attack.
One significant problem with this approach is in the area of New
Jersey’s mandatory domestic violence arrest law. The legislature has
traditionally afforded police officers discretion on whether to make
239
an arrest upon responding to a call. In contrast, the PDVA requires
that the police make an arrest in certain cases involving domestic
240
violence as interpreted under the PDVA.
Therefore, under an
expanded definition of “household member,” officers would be
mandated to arrest in response to domestic violence calls in a
substantially increased number of situations. Consequently, an
expanded definition of “household member” under the PDVA could
potentially lead to increased litigation.
Another adverse effect that could arise if the legislature adopted
this approach would be an increase in frivolous restraining order case
filings. If a broader category of potential plaintiffs could seek relief,
there might be a need to mitigate the harm from an abuse of the
system. It would be nearly impossible to draft a definition that
protects the especially vulnerable without protecting those that the
statute is not intended to protect. The primary challenge would
involve defining the living arrangements to which the amended
statute would apply. For example, would the expanded definition of
“household member” apply to persons living in the same apartment
complex, with perhaps a shared parking lot and mailbox area, but
not the same apartment building? What about a townhouse
community that shares common areas such as a gym? It is likely that
239
240

See N.J. STAT. ANN. §59:3-2(a) (West 2011).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21 (West 2011).
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the legislature left the interpretation of “household member” to the
courts to avoid these questions that better lend themselves to a caseby-case analysis.
B. An Alternative-Remedy Statute to Protect Women from Acquaintance
and Stranger Violence
The New Jersey Legislature should add an alternative-remedy
statute to the law that is modeled after similar statutes enacted by
other states and that affords women the option of obtaining a
restraining order in situations involving violence perpetrated by an
241
acquaintance or a stranger. The historic nature of marriage was the
impetus for the construction of domestic violence law in its initial
242
In light of the changed circumstances involving different
form.
relationships and varied living situations, it is incumbent upon the
legislature to take action that recognizes the reality that there are
many victims of violence currently in need of, but unable to obtain,
civil protection orders. New Jersey domestic violence law has evolved
to reflect changing relationships, thereby offering protection to an
increased and broad range of people. But the most consequential,
and the most effective, change to New Jersey law would be the
addition of an alternative civil protective order option to the
domestic violence civil restraining order and criminal law options
already in place.
The legislature specifically stated that “the official response to
domestic violence shall communicate the attitude that violent
243
behavior will not be excused or tolerated.”
An alternative-remedy
statute that applies to non-intimate partner violence can further that
objective and act in combination with the PDVA to accomplish the
stated goal. As aforementioned, civil protection orders are now the
most frequently used legal remedy to address intimate partner
244
violence.
Civil protection orders should thus be available to a
broader range of potential victims, including women living under the
same roof as someone who has assaulted or harassed them. An
alternative civil protection order statute would potentially allow any
woman to obtain a protection order against someone who presents
241

See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC., § 3-1503 (2009). For example,
Maryland has removed its relationship requirement entirely. Id. It allows any woman
to obtain a civil protection order without proving the existence of a prior
relationship. Id. A woman merely needs to be subject to an act that that places her
in fear of imminent serious bodily harm to have a civil protection order issued. Id.
242
Tsai, supra note 36, at 1289.
243
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (West 2011).
244
See supra Part III.
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an imminent danger to her safety.
It is counterintuitive to allow such violence to be excused and, by
extension, tolerated when the addition of a civil protection order law
would sufficiently address this problem. The purpose of protective
245
orders is to prevent violence or stop it from escalating.
The
distinction between women in S.P.’s situation and women who are
protected under the PDVA is razor-thin, and a criminal order of
protection is often insufficient to a potential victim’s needs. But in
New Jersey, the law allows a woman to obtain a civil protection order
246
only where she is a victim of domestic violence.
New Jersey’s
legislative scheme is outdated. The addition of an alternative civil
protection order statute would merely provide protection where it is
needed. If New Jersey had adopted Maryland’s law, S.P. would have
been able to immediately obtain a civil protection order after her first
encounter with Santiago because his actions placed her in fear of
247
imminent bodily harm.
Maryland does not require a “relationship” pre-requisite for a
248
petitioner to seek relief through a civil protection order.
Instead,
Maryland allows a woman to seek relief by filing a petition with the
court that alleges a petitioner was guilty of an act that places the
petitioner in fear of imminent serious bodily harm, stalking, or
249
harassment.
If New Jersey had a similar law in place, S.P. would
have had an opportunity to seek relief prior to her attack.
The proposed statute would authorize the immediate issuance of
an ex parte protective order where the PDVA does not apply, most
likely because the victim lacks a prior relationship with the offender.
It would allow a court to issue a TRO upon an allegation that a
person had committed an offense such as harassment, stalking,
assault, sexual assault, or terroristic threats. Therefore, the statute
would allow a casual acquaintance or a co-worker to obtain a TRO,
which is currently unavailable under the PDVA. Therefore, New
Jersey should permit a petitioner who suffers from such offenses as
protected by the PDVA to petition the court for an order that the
defendant: (1) refrain from abusing or harassing the plaintiff; (2)
refrain from contacting the plaintiff; (3) remain away from the
plaintiff’s household, workplace, or school; and (4) pay the plaintiff
monetary compensation for the losses suffered as a direct result of
245
246
247
248
249

Smith, supra note 74, at 139–40.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-17–35 (West 2011).
See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC., § 3-1503 (2009).
Id.
Id.
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the defendant’s actions.
The proposed statute would also allow the court to enter such
temporary relief orders without notice, as it deems necessary to
protect the plaintiff. The durational aspect of the protection
afforded by temporary relief is important. The legislature should
institute a time limit of six months for such an order. A significant
time limit may conceivably minimize the potential damage from the
anticipated increase in frivolous filings, as manifested by differing
situations that may arise such as verbal harassment or physical
violence. Also, in many cases of stranger and acquaintance abuse, the
likelihood of chance interaction will abate after a few years due to
intervening factors. For instance, people often move, change jobs, or
change schools. The goal of the legislature should be to limit
potential system-wide abuse, while still providing victims with the
requisite protection. New Jersey must follow Maryland’s lead and
reform its civil protection order laws to provide broader protection to
potential victims of sexual assault by those who may not be
considered “household members” under the PDVA. It can do so by
no longer limiting the ability of victims to obtain restraining orders
solely to those who are victims of domestic violence.
Despite the inevitable criticism of a newly adopted alternative
remedy statute, its potential benefits far outweigh any shortcoming of
such a law. Critics can, for example, rightly argue that a protection
order does not guarantee a woman’s safety, because the law could not
guarantee that victims will remain safe from harm once a civil
protective order is granted. If an abuser wants to harm his victim, or
even kill her, a protective order or a short jail sentence will probably
250
not stop him.
But the possibility that a protection order will not
help a potential victim should not prevent those who will benefit
from a protection order from obtaining one. Critics may also argue
that it would be too expensive for New Jersey to expand its protection
to victims of violence in non-intimate partner relationships. But
studies have shown that the use of protective orders can save New
Jersey a significant amount of money in law enforcement and
251
governing expenses. One can argue that the failure to enact such a
statute is imposing unnecessary costs, both financial and emotional,
on New Jersey.
250

See Anique Droin, Comment, Who Turned Out the Lights? How Maryland Laws
Fail to Protect Victims of Domestic Violence from Third-Party Abuse, 36 U. BALT. L. REV.
105, 106 (2006).
251
See Stoever, supra note 53, at 308. A recent study estimates that protection
orders save Kentucky $85 million per year. Id.
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Although the New Jersey Legislature may not be able to prevent
every incident of abuse, it must fill the gaps in the law that can be
filled. In S.P., such a law would have left no doubt that S.P. was
legally entitled to obtain a restraining order after her eventual
attacker harassed her for the first time. The restraining order would
have served notice to Santiago that he was to stay away from S.P. or
face criminal charges. This may or may not have deterred Santiago
in this particular instance, but it would certainly offer relief in many
cases where an alternative option would not otherwise exist.
This Comment does not advocate a change of New Jersey’s
domestic violence statute. It is true that S.P. may not have been able
to secure protection prior to her attack under the domestic violence
laws of any other state. But other states offer an alternative civil
252
protective order as part of their anti-harassment statutes.
New
Jersey must follow the more progressive states that take this approach
by adopting a similar statute to offer women like S.P. an alternative
form of protection. As discussed, Maryland currently has a law that
New Jersey should examine in order to provide its own alternativeremedy statute.
VII. CONCLUSION
Domestic violence is a pervasive social problem that harms
253
hundreds of women in the United States on a daily basis.
Lawmakers responded to the feminist movement of the 1960s by
enacting domestic violence laws in an attempt to offer women better
254
protection.
New Jersey has one of the most liberal and expansive
255
domestic violence laws among the states. Specifically, the judiciary
has liberally interpreted the term “household member” to afford
256
But the PDVA still
broad protection to many potential victims.
257
leaves many who are not covered under the Act unprotected. Such
victims are forced to pursue remedies under oft-inadequate criminal
laws. Consequently, the need for reform in New Jersey is clear.
Both acquaintances and strangers commit violent acts against
women, and their actions transcend the sphere of domestic violence.
The shift in the role of protective orders from instruments to prevent
family violence to mechanisms to prevent stranger-induced violence
252
253
254
255
256
257

See supra note 93.
See supra Part II.
Id.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part V.A.
See supra Part V.

TAMBURRI (DO NOT DELETE)

1074

5/28/2013 1:58 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1041

supports an amendment to the current law in New Jersey. Many
states have implemented alternative remedy statutes to offer
particularly susceptible women the opportunity to obtain civil
258
protection orders if they are in imminent danger.
These statutes
represent progress in the effort to offer women protection from
stranger-induced violence. But this remedy is not available to
potential victims in New Jersey. Women who live in boarding houses
may be particularly prone to violence, and are currently defenseless.
The legislature must add an alternative remedy statute that
would allow potential victims from non-intimate partner violence to
259
obtain civil protection orders.
It can do so by creating an
alternative statute to limit the relief available to victims not in a
domestic violence relationship. By doing so, the legislature can
minimize the potential damage from the anticipated increased
number of frivolous or “less serious” filings, while still providing
victims with the requisite protection. All women are entitled to be
safe from violence. New Jersey should adopt a civil protection order
law to offer its women protection from non-intimate partner violence.

258
259

See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part VI.

